14 October 2026 GoDaddy, Infoblox, Google and Cloudflare Demonstrate Secure AI Agent Transactions Across Platforms. Read the press release →

Hands-on

Watch a rogue agent get refused. Then build the seller that refuses it.

Two self-paced labs, run on Instruqt in your browser. The guided tour walks through a purchase between two AI agents and shows what happens when one of them tries to overspend. The builder track has you stand up your own agent, get a human’s approval for a purchase, then attack your own seller four ways.

Each lab is a sealed sandbox of its own: a seller, a buyer, an approval authority, an agent registry, an independent verifier and a private copy of the DNS, all on reserved .test names. Nothing in a lab touches a public system. Payments are simulated; no money moves, real or test-mode.

~15 minutes · 5 challenges · in your browser, no install

Guided tour (no technical background)

For security leaders, policy audiences and anyone new to the idea

One challenge per question, each a page in your browser and one question to answer. You approve a purchase yourself and watch the seller refuse a replayed one. The commands behind every page are there if you want them, never required.

  1. Where is it? Open the seller's shop and see what its domain says about it, in plain words.
  2. Is it really them? Put the real shop and a lookalike side by side, and see the one check that tells them apart.
  3. Did a human say yes? Approve a purchase yourself, then find your approval on the seller's record.
  4. Does the seller enforce it? Replay an approval that was already used, and watch the seller refuse it.
  5. Can anyone check it later? Read an independent verifier's scorecard for the purchase.
Launch lab

~60 minutes · 8 challenges · terminal

Builder (engineers)

For engineers and agent builders

You own a domain in the sandbox, builder.test, and an agent under it. By the end, a buyer has found and verified your agent, a human-approved purchase has gone through it, four rogue attacks have failed against it, and a verifier has scored it.

  1. Publish your agent's identity in your own domain, builder.test, signed so nobody can forge it.
  2. Serve your agent's card: who runs it, where it is, what it can do.
  3. Register with the lab's Agent Name Service (ANS).
  4. Point a buyer agent at your seller and watch it discover and verify you.
  5. Request a mandate from the approval authority and approve it yourself.
  6. Run a legitimate purchase through your own seller and read what it checked.
  7. Attack your own seller four ways (replay, over-ceiling, tamper, lookalike) and confirm each is refused with the right reason code.
  8. Run the independent verifier and read its scorecard for the agent you built.
Launch lab

What the labs do and don’t show

Refusals in the labs are the seller’s own: each one comes back with a published reason code and a signed entry in the seller’s ledger naming the check that caught it. Identity checks show that the domain vouches for the agent; they do not prove which company operates it. Payment intents are minted by the lab and never sent to a payment network.

Try it now from your terminal

Five questions a buyer agent asks before it trusts a seller, run by hand against the live demonstration systems. They are read-only: nothing here spends money or changes state.

Who runs this agent, and what can it do?

curl -s https://seller.skybound-travel.com/.well-known/agent-card.json

The seller agent's own ID card: operator, endpoint, capabilities. This is the A2A agent card format. On its own it is a claim; the next three commands are what let a buyer check it.

Does the seller's domain say this agent exists?

dig +dnssec seller.skybound-travel.com TYPE64

The domain itself answers: a signed DNS-AID record (SVCB) saying where the agent lives, which protocol it speaks, and the URL and fingerprint of its card. The RRSIG line is the zone's signature. A buyer that starts here is not taking a search result's word for where the seller lives.

Is the certificate the one the domain owner chose?

dig +short _443._tcp.seller.skybound-travel.com TLSA

The domain owner publishes which key its agent's host must present. A lookalike or a swapped certificate at the same address fails this check before any request is sent. This is the DANE check, one link in the identity chain.

Does anyone outside the domain vouch for it?

dig +short TXT _ans.seller.skybound-travel.com

The seller's Agent Name Service (ANS) record, pointing to its registration in a public transparency log. Everything above lives inside the seller's own zone, so a lookalike with its own DNSSEC and keys could pass it. This is the one check anchored outside the zone.

What has the seller actually done?

curl -s https://seller.skybound-travel.com/ledger

The seller's own signed, hash-chained log of its actions, including every request it refused and why. Anyone can read it; nobody can quietly edit it.

Engage with us

Stuck in a lab, found a check that should have fired, or want to run this against your own agents? Join the Discord, or work with us.